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Toyota and Why It Is So Successful
Robert B. Austenfeld, Jr.
1) As of May 2006 GM was still struggling to stay out of bankruptcy.
(Received on May 10, 2006)
1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to describe one of the most successful companies
in the world and explain the reasons for that success. Fortune magazine’s Febru-
ary 20, 2006 edition featured this headline on its cover: “The Tragedy of General
Motors” and a story of GM’s woes by Carol J. Loomis. Two weeks later,
Fortune’s next edition on March 6, 2006 had this headline on its cover: “How
Toyota Does It: The Triumph of the Prius.” This stark contrast is typical of the
stories circulating in the media these days. At a time when a company that was
once admired and for many years held the lofty position of the world biggest
automaker appears on the brink of bankruptcy1), Toyota is about to overtake it in
global sales this year (O’Dell, 2005). Why is Toyota continuing to thrive at a
time when other carmakers are struggling to survive?
At the outset I would like to acknowledge the main source for much of the in-
formation in this paper: The Toyota Way: 14 Management Principles from the
World’s Greatest Manufacturer by Jeffrey K. Liker (2004).
This paper is organized as follows:
1. Introduction
2. The history of Toyota
3. The Toyota Way
4. Summary and conclusion
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2. The History of Toyota
For organizational convenience I will discuss Toyota history as follows:
• The start
• The 1940s
• The 1950s
• Etc.
The start. The Toyota Motor Corp. (TMC) had its beginning in 1933 when it
was established as a division within the Toyoda Automatic Loom Works, Ltd.
The founder of Toyota was Kiichiro Toyoda (1894–1952), the son of Sakichi
Toyoda (1867–1930). The values that have underpinned Toyota success started
with Sakichi who was the son of a carpenter. According to Liker (2004) he was
greatly influenced by Samuel Smiles book Self-Help first published in 1859 (p.
17). This book focused on inventors and how their success was mostly due to
hard work and persistence. Sakichi went from carpentry, which he had learned
from his father, to making looms for weaving. He then came up with many in-
ventions that resulted in remarkable improvements in looms. For example, by
1924 he had developed the famous “Type G” automatic loom, but not without
much of that “hard work and persistence.” One of the important features of
Toyoda’s looms was a device that would automatically stop the loom should a
thread break. This prevented any defective cloth from being produced. This con-
cept of building into a machine features that prevent poor quality is know as
jidoka and would become one of the TMC’s two “pillars” of the Toyota Produc-
tion System (TPS).2)  According to Wikipedia (Sakichi Toyoda, 2006) Sakichi is
often referred to as the “King of Japanese Inventors” and as the “father of the
Japanese industrial revolution.”
2) The other is just-in-time.
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In 1926 Sakichi started the Toyoda Automatic Loom Works that, due to the
superiority of the Toyoda looms, became highly successful. Even today, Toyota
produces highly praised spinning and weaving machines. However, to Sakichi’s
credit he recognized that more than weaving machines, the automobile was the
wave of the future. Therefore he encouraged his son, Kiichiro to get into the
automobile business. Drawing on the resources of the Toyoda loom business,
in 1930, Kiichiro began doing research into small gasoline-powered engines
(History of Toyota [HOT], 2006) and, as mentioned, an automobile division
was established within the Toyoda loom works in 1933. But it wasn’t just to
increase the Toyoda fortunes that caused the elder Toyoda to encourage his
son. As quoted in Liker (2004, p. 18) from Reingold (1999), this is what Sakichi
told Kiichiro:
Everyone should tackle some great project at least once in their life. I de-
voted most of my life to inventing new kinds of looms. Now it is your turn.
You should make an effort to complete something that will benefit society.
Which exemplifies another part of the Toyota philosophy3): that a company
should always do what it can to better society.
According to Liker, there was a lot of hard learning for Toyota in those early
years:
Toyota Motor Corporation struggled through the 1930s, primarily making
simple trucks. In the early years, the company produced poor-quality ve-
hicles with primitive technology (e.g., hammering body panels over logs)
and had little success. (p. 20)
But, with persistence in 1935 Toyota came out with its first prototype car, the
A1. According the Stephenson (2006): “Its body was a copy of the Chrysler Air-
flow, the 3389cc engine was copied from a Chevrolet and the chassis was copied
3) Besides hard work and persistence.
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4) According to this homepage, this was intentional to provide a source of interchange-
able parts.
5) According to Wikipedia (Toyota Motor Corporation [TMC]) the name was changed
from Toyoda to Toyota for three reasons: (1) to differentiate the founders’ work from
his personal life, (2) ease of pronunciation, and (3) to give the company a happy begin-
ning as “Toyota” has eight strokes in katakana (トヨタ) and eight is considered a lucky
number in Japan.
from a Ford.4)” That same year production
of the G1 truck began. According to
Stephenson:
Early units broke down a lot, so cus-
tomers were carefully chosen for
loyalty. Aftermarket sale support
was so strong that entire trucks were
often replaced without question. Development and production engineers
were loaned to dealers so that repairs could be done and so that the engi-
neers could learn about what needed to be changed in production.
And, in 1936 Toyota came out with its first production car, the Model AA Se-
dan.
In 1937 the Toyota Motor Co (TMC)5)
was established as an independent com-
pany. One year later the first TMC plant
started operations and the just-in-time
system was launched on a full-scale basis
(HOT). This plant (Honsha), near Toyota’s
head office in Aichi Prefecture (near Nagoya), is still operating making Land
Cruisers (Toyota Company Profile [TCP], 2005).
The 1940s. This was a time of dramatic change for Toyota. It was expanding
rapidly trying to meet the demands of WWII and later the consumer market.
G1 Truck
Model AA Sedan
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According to Wikipedia (Toyota Motor Corporation [TMC]):
During the Pacific War the company was dedicated to truck production for
the Imperial Army. Because of severe
shortages in Japan, military trucks
were kept as simple as possible. For
example, the trucks had only one
headlight on the center of the hood.
Fortunately for Toyota, the war
ended shortly before a scheduled al-
lied bombing run on the Toyota factories in Aichi.
Following the war, production returned to the needs of the consumer with the
introduction of the SB small truck and the SA compact passenger car in 1947.
That same year Toyota celebrated the production of its 100,000th vehicle (HOT).
During this decade Toyota established several supporting firms as shown in
Appendix A.
The 1950s. The 1950s were again a time of remarkable change for Toyota.
Two people now take on prominent roles in Toyota’s development: Eiji Toyoda
and Taiichi Ohno. In a way one can say their contributions were “just-in-time.”
Towards the end of the 1940s Toyota was experiencing a severe cash flow prob-
lem. In trying to stave off bankruptcy, it called for strict cost cutting and a re-
quest for “voluntary” retirements. This led to a labor dispute that was only
quelled when the president, Kiichiro, accepted responsibility and resigned. This
personal sacrifice on the part of Kiichiro reflects one of the foundational ele-
ments of Toyota’s philosophy. As Liker puts it:
The philosophy of Toyota to this day is to think beyond individual concerns
to the long-term good of the company, as well as to take responsibility for
problems. Kiichiro Toyoda was leading by example… (p. 19)
At this same time when Toyota was near collapse Eiji Toyoda and Taiichi
WWII truck with one headlight
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Ohno were busy devising ways that the company could better compete with its
American counterparts, Ford and GM. Towards this end Eiji, who had been given
a leading role in the company, visited U.S. plants to learn the secret of their suc-
cess. What he found was both good and bad: the good was the continuous flow
system of the assembly line, the bad was the batch and queue system of making
parts. Large companies like Ford and GM could afford to make a lot of one part
at one time and have huge inventories of it sitting around to be used, Toyota
didn’t have that luxury. This led Eiji and Taiichi Ohno (a production genius) to
continue perfecting the just-in-time system with the idea of not making and
delivering a part to the assembly line until it is called for; in other words, a “pull”
system.
According to Liker (2004) about this time Toyota began applying some of W.
Edwards Deming’s6)  ideas such as everyone being responsible for meeting the
customer’s expectations, the idea of an internal customer, the PDCA cycle7), and
kaizen (continual incremental improvement). In fact, in 1965, Toyota won
Japan’s top quality award named after Deming.
As these ideas were adopted and put into practice, the now famous Toyota
Production System (TPS) gradually emerged.
By the 1960s, TPS was a powerful philosophy that all types of businesses
and processes could learn to use, but this would take a while. Toyota did
take the first steps to spread “lean”8)  by diligently teaching the principles of
6) Deming (1900–1993) is considered one of the most influential members in the qual-
ity movement and is famous for his Fourteen Points (see Appendix B). For a brief his-
tory of Deming see Austenfeld (2001).
7) Also known as the Deming cycle, the Plan, Do, Check, Act (PDCA) cycle is a way
of approaching almost any task: based on “customer” expectations, plan the task, then
do it, then check to see how well the results conform to what the customer wanted, fi-
nally act to improve the results.
8) A generic name for the TPS.
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TPS to their key suppliers. (Liker, 2004, p. 24)
The 1950s saw Toyota, despite its earlier difficulties, continue to come out
with new models of cars and trucks such as the famous Crown introduced in
1955. In fact by 1955 Toyota was making 8,400 cars per year and 600,000 cars
per year by 1965 (Toyota Corporate History [TCH]).
Some other notable events that took place during the 1950s were (HOT):
• 1951: The creative idea suggestion system was started.
• 1953: The corporate slogan “Good Thinking, Good Products” was estab-
lished.
• 1957: Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A. Inc. was established.
• 1958: Toyota opens a plant in Brazil (its first outside of Japan).
• 1959: Toyota’s second Japanese plant starts operations (Motomachi).
The 1960s. This decade was one of explosive growth for Toyota. By 1962
Toyota had produced its one-millionth vehicle domestically. It was a time of ex-
panding exports too with cumulative exports also reaching the one million mark
by 1969 (HOT).
In 1961 Toyota announced what it hoped would be car for everyone much like
the original Volkswagen. The Publica—for “Public Car”—was small, cheap,
economical, and plain. It fact it proved too plain for a Japanese public that was
moving upscale faster than Toyota realized. So Toyota, in typically fashion,
reacted to give the customer what he or she wanted, the famous Corolla. As
Stephenson (2005) describes it (under
“Corolla Production Data”):
Japan’s growing middle class
thought the Publica (Toyota’s entry
level car in the early 1960’s) was too
boring while the Crown and Corona
were too expensive for them. At this 1966 Toyota Corolla
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time, a Toyota engineer called Tatsuo Hasegawa had noticed that the Opel
Kadett was doing very well in Germany. The Kadett was a very light car
that looked good, was fun to drive and was replacing the VW beetle as the
car to have in Germany. Hasegawa designed the Corolla around the same
ideas as the Kadett. It was sized between the Publica (700cc) and Corona
(1500cc)9), looked classy, had modest power, yet was economical and inex-
pensive.
The Corolla was announced in 1966 and, according to Stephenson, by March
1968 more than 3,000 were being exported every month. In fact, once it was
introduced into America in 1968 with its selling price of $1,800, sales there grew
at a rapid pace. The Corolla was on the way to becoming “the people’s car” for
the entire world!
Perhaps the other most significant thing that happened in this decade was the
signing of a Labor-Management Joint Declaration in 1962. As explained in the
Toyota Environmental & Social Report 2003 (under Social and Economic
Aspects, Employees):
Following a labor dispute in 1950, mutual trust between labor and manage-
ment was adopted as the foundation of labor-management relations in the
joint labor and management declaration concluded in 1962. Since then,
repeated discussions have led to deeper understanding and trust between la-
bor and management.
Considering the often-negative affect of unions on American automakers, this
continuing effort on Toyota part to foster mutual trust and respect between labor
and management surely has contributed to its success. Appendix C provides more
9) According to Stephenson, Nissan was coming out with its Sunny model a few months
before the Corolla. Since the Sunny would have a new 1000cc engine Toyota told its
engineers to increase the Corolla’s new engine by 100cc from the planned 1000cc. Al-
though difficult this late in the development, it was accomplished and Toyota could
then advertise the Corolla as “the 100cc advantage.”
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information about this relationship.
Some other notable events that took place during the 1960s were (HOT):
• 1961: Toyota Motor Thailand Co., Ltd. established.
• 1965: Toyota awarded the Deming Prize, Japan’s highest honor for qual-
ity.
Toyota’s Kamigo Plant (engines) starts operations.
• 1966: Toyota’s Takaoka Plant starts operations—current main products:
Corolla, Allex, Platz, Funcargo, Vitz, ist, Sienta, Porte.
• 1968: Toyota’s Miyoshi Plant starts operations—current main products:
drive trains, forged parts.
The 1970s. The 1970s saw Toyota continuing to advance in both sales and
quality. As the Toyota Production System (TPS) became
more and more refined, Toyota was able to ramp up pro-
duction yet not at the expense of the quality and reliability
of its vehicles. Having already won the Deming Prize in
1965, Toyota became the first company to be awarded the
Japan Quality Control Medal. According the Union of
Japanese Scientists and Engineers (JUSE) homepage
(2006, under The Deming Prize):
When it is recognized that an applicant’s implementation of TQM has im-
proved substantially beyond the level at the time it won the Deming Appli-
cation Prize, the company is awarded the Japan Quality Medal.
This was also the decade when Toyota came out with the Celica, it’s popular
sports car. In 1965 Toyota produced the sporty but small Sports 800, and then in
1967 a much beefier 2000GT. However, as Stephenson (under Celica History)
puts it:
The large Toyota 2000GT of the late 1960’s was a success but was it was
too expensive to manufacture. The small S800 was also successful but only
The Japan Quality
Control Medal
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appealed to the outright enthusiast. Toyota wanted a new sports car that
would appeal to more average buyers. It had to be easy to drive, practical
and reliable.
Then, in 1978, Toyota introduced the Celica XX now known as the Supra. This
was a beefed up Celica deriving much of its ancestry from the 2000GT. For
many years these cars were extremely popular and used in competitions. How-
ever, according to two Wikipedia sites (Toyota Celica and Toyota Supra) produc-
tion of the legendary Celica has all but stopped.
The Sports 800 The 2000GT The Celica (1970)
Some other models that came out during the 1970s were: Carina (now Allion),
Light Ace, Publica Starlet, Town Ace, Chaser, Tercel, and Corsa.
By 1972 Toyota had produced its ten millionth vehicle domestically and
cumulative exports reached five and ten million units respectively in 1975 and
1979.
Some other notable events that took place during the 1970s were (HOT):
• 1970: Toyota’s Tsutsumi Plant starts operations—current main products:
Camry, Premio, Allion, Caldina, Wish, Prius, Scion tC.
• 1973: Toyota’s Myochi Plant starts operations—current main products:
engines, chassis casting parts.
Calty Design Research, Inc. established at Newport Beach, CA to
support North American operations and provide design solutions for
many of Toyota’s cars (see About Toyota under Operations, De-
sign/R&D).
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• 1975: Toyota’s Shimoyama Plant starts operations—current main prod-
ucts: engines, turbochargers, variable valve timing, catalytic con-
verters.
• 1977: Toyota Technical Center U.S.A., Inc. established at Ann Arbor,
Michigan to support Toyota’s North American engineering and
R&D activities (see About Toyota under Operations, Design/R&D).
• 1978: Toyota’s Kinuura Plant starts operations—current main products:
drive trains, casting parts.
• 1979: Toyota’s Tahara Plant starts operations—current main products:
Celsior, GS, Ipsm, RAV4, 4-Runner, Land Cruiser Prado, engines.
The 1980s. Toyota’s production and sales continue to soar. By 1985 cumula-
tive exports had reached 20 million units and by 1986 Toyota had produced its
50 millionth vehicle domestically (HOT). Figure 1 show just how fast Toyota’s
production, sales, and exports were growing. Note that the 1980s were also when
Toyota’s overseas production began taking off.
Figure 1. Trends in Toyota’s domestic production, domestic sales, export shipments, and
overseas production (adapted from Toyota Company Profile [TCP], p. 4)
No doubt the two most significant events for Toyota in the 1980s were the
Papers of the Research Society of Commerce and Economics, Vol. XXXXVII No. 1
120 ――
start of the NUMMI operation in 1984 and the development of the Lexus during
the last half of the decade. The New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMI)
was established as a joint 50/50 venture with GM to reactivate a GM plant in Fre-
mont, California. This huge plant continues to this day as a benchmark against
which other U.S. plants measure themselves10). NUMMI’s current main products
are Toyota’s Corolla and Tacoma pickup truck, and GM’s Pontiac Vibe.
According to the English version of the Lexus homepage (Lexus History, 2006)
the Lexus story started in August 1983: “At a top-
level, top-secret meeting, Toyota Chairman Eiji
Toyoda determines the time is right to create a luxury
vehicle to challenge the world’s best.” By “the
world’s best” at the time was generally meant brands
like Mercedes and BMW. As related in Liker (2004) to accomplish this feat,
Toyota assigned Ichiro Suzuki as the lead engineer. Suzuki had become a legend
within Toyota and was known as the “Michael Jordan” of chief engineers (p. 43).
After conducting a couple of focus group interviews with “luxury car” owners,
Suzuki began compiling the features that he thought such people wanted. For
example, in rank order, these were the things most important to buyers of
Mercedes:
• Status and prestige of image
• High quality
• Resale value
• Performance (e.g., handling, ride, power)
• Safety. (Liker, p. 45)
Despite the relatively low rank of performance, Suzuki felt it was one of the most
important attributes of a car and, as quoted in Liker, he wanted “…to build a car
10) Usually coming up short!
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that beats Mercedes-Benz in the most basic function a car has, its driving perfor-
mance.” In fact, Suzuki set targets for the Lexus based on beating an “equiva-
lent” Mercedes and BMW in five areas: top speed, fuel consumption, noise (qui-
etness), aerodynamics, and vehicle weight (Liker, p. 47). The guiding philosophy
for the development effort was a set of “no-compromise” goals as shown in
Figure 2.
1989 Lexus LS400
Figure 2.  The “No-Compromise” goals for the Lexus development (from Liker,
2004, p. 48)
As can be seen, these are goals that nor-
mally work against each other so the chal-
lenge for the design team was to meet
both simultaneously. For example the sec-
ond set: “Fast and smooth ride YET low
fuel consumption” required a completely
new engine. When the engine engineers
said such an engine couldn’t be mass-produced, Suzuki asked if they could at
least try to make one. When they finally managed to do this, they (the engineers)
became excited about figuring out how to do it on a mass production basis. Thus,
with patience, persistence, and encouragement, the Lexus began to take shape as
Suzuki wanted and the proof is in the pudding in that it was an immediate hit
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when it went on sale in the U.S. in September 1989!
Some other notable events that took place during the 1980s were (HOT):
• 1981: Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. and Toyota Motor Sales Co., Ltd. merged
into Toyota Motor Corporation.
• 1986: Toyota’s Teiho Plant starts operations—current main products: ma-
chinery, dies for casting/forging plastic molds.
• 1987: Toyota Technical Center of Europe established in Belgium (now
TMME Technical Center).
• 1988: Toyota Motor Manufacturing, U.S.A., Inc. (TMM) starts operations
in Georgetown, Kentucky (now Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Ken-
tucky, Inc. [TMMK])—current man products: Avalon, Camry,
Solara, engines.
• 1989: Toyota’s Hirose Plant starts operations—current main products:
electronic parts and components.
Tokyo Design Center established.
The 1990s. Although Toyota had been steadily developing overseas production
facilities it was in this decade that such production really took off. By 1994
annual overseas output had exceeded one million units (HOT) and was on the
rise (see Figure 1). Toyota would continue to add new brands to its line up such
as the Estima, Windom, RAV4, Avalon, Harrier, and, most significantly, the
Prius hybrid.
In fact, introduction of the Prius in 1997 was to change the auto industry for
all time, as it was a radical departure from the use of a gasoline or diesel engine
only to power the vehicle. Now a gasoline engine would be coupled with a bat-
tery-powered electric motor to improve the car’s fuel mileage. But the Prius
didn’t start as a hybrid. In the early 1990s there was concern that Toyota needed
to begin thinking about how it could do a better job of developing and manufac-
turing cars as the company moved into the 21st century. This concern then
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1997 Prius
11) And how right he was with almost every major manufacturer now coming out with
hybrids.
morphed into the Global 21 (G21) project to build a car that was just the oppo-
site of the gas-guzzlers of the time. In fact the challenge was to build a car that
was relatively small yet roomy inside and with radically better fuel economy.
The initial goal was for a 50% improvement over the then current fuel economy.
In 1994 management changed this to 100%. Given the state of technology at the
time, this essentially eliminated everything except a hybrid gas/electric power
combination.
Once the hybrid concept was decided on, the project began to move along, not
a little influenced by Hiroshi Okuda, who became Toyota’s president in 1995.
When Okuda asked about when the G21 would be ready he was told the devel-
opment team was “aiming for December 1998, ‘if all goes well.’” To which
Okuda replied:
That is too late; no good. Can you get it done a year earlier? There will be
great significance in launching the car
early. This car may change the course
of Toyota’s future and even that of the
auto industry.11)  (Itazaki, 1999 as quoted
in Liker, 2004, p. 58)
So the target launch date was now December
1997. As related in Liker, remarkable, even
heroic efforts allowed the engineering team to not only meet that date but also
better it by two months with an October 1997 launch! For more on this remark-
able effort see Liker (2004), Chapter 6 and Taylor (2006).
Some other notable events that took place during the 1980s were (HOT &
TCP):
• 1992: Toyota’s Guiding Principles announced (see Appendix D).
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Toyota Motor Manufacturing (U.K.), Ltd. (TMUK Ltd.) starts
operations.
Toyota Motor Hokkaido, Inc. starts operations—current main prod-
ucts: transmissions, drive train parts, aluminum wheels.
Toyota motor Kyushu, Inc. starts operations—current main prod-
ucts: Harrier, Kluger V.
• 1998: Toyota Motor Manufacturing Indiana, Inc. (TMMI, Inc.) starts
operations—current main products: Tundra truck, Sequoia, Sienna.
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, West Virginia, Inc. (TMMWV) starts
operations—current main products: engines, transmissions.
Toyota Motor Tohoku, Inc. starts operations—current main prod-
ucts: mechanical and electronic parts.
The 2000s. The 2000s might be described as the decade of globalization for
Toyota. For example these are some of the foreign operations by start year and
their current main products listed under Toyota Up Close (Quarterly Highlights)
(2006):
• 2000: Sichuan FAW Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. (SCTM) in China (Coaster,
Land Cruiser Prado).
• 2001: Toyota Motor Manufacturing France S.A.S. (TMMF) (Yaris, en-
gines).
• 2002: Toyota Motor Manufacturing Poland Sp.zo.o. (TMMP) (transmis-
sions, engines).
Toyota Kirloskar Auto Parts Private Ltd. (TKAP) in India (axels,
propeller shafts, transmissions).
Tianjin FAW Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. (TTMC) in China (Corolla,
Vios, Crown, Reiz),
• 2003: Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Alabama, Inc. (TMMAL) in the U.S.
(engines).
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12) The Toyota Up Close reference (February, 2006, p. 11) show 75 different Toyota
models and 8 different Lexus models as making up Toyota worldwide product line-up!
13) Demand continues to exceed supply.
Changchun FAW Fengyue Auto Co. Ltd in China (Land Cruiser,
Prius).
• 2004: Toyota Motor Manufacturing de Baja California S.de R.L. de C.V.
(TMMBC) in Mexico (truck beds, Tacoma).
FAW Toyota Changchun Engine Co., Ltd. in China (engines).
• 2005: Guangqi Toyota Engine Co., Ltd. in China (engines, engine parts
[cam shafts, crank shafts]).
Toyota Peugeot Citroën Automobile Czech, s.r.o. (TPCA) in the
Czech Republic (Aygo).
Toyota Motor Industries Poland Sp.zo.o. (TTIP) (engines).
• 2006: Guangzhou Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. in China (Camry)—planned as
of this writing.
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Texas, Inc. (TMMTX) in the U.S.
(Tundra)—planned as of this writing.
• 2007: Toyota Motor Manufacturing Russia, Ltd. (Camry)—planned as of
this writing.
During the 2000s Toyota continues to come out with new models: Opa, Kluger
V, Allex, Allion, Voxy, Brevis, Verossa, ist, Alphard, Succeed, WISH, Sienta,
Avensis, Passo, etc., etc.12)
North American production continues to set records with a cumulative produc-
tion of 10 million units achieved in 2002. In the same year the highly successful
Prius achieved sales of 100,000 (HOT)13) .
2002 was also the year Toyota entered Formula One (F1) competition which it
continue to vigorously pursue (see Toyota F1 Team official site at http://
www.toyota-f1.com/public/en/index_e. html).
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14) At ¥112/$ (May 9, 2006), $165.6 billion.
Toyota today. As stated on page one of the Toyota Up Close reference:
Toyota Motor Corporation is one of the world’s leading auto manufactur-
ers, offering a full range of models, from minivehicles to large trucks. Global
sales of its Toyota and Lexus brands, combined with those of Daihatsu and
Hino, totaled 8.12 million units from January 1, 2005 to December 31,
2005*. Besides its own 12 plants and a number of manufacturing subsidiar-
ies and affiliates in Japan, Toyota has 53 manufacturing companies in 27
countries and regions, which produce Lexus- and Toyota-brand vehicles and
components. As of March 2005, Toyota employs approximately 265,800
people worldwide (on a consolidated basis), and markets vehicles in more
than 170 countries. Toyota’s automotive business, including sales finance,
accounts for more than 90% of the company’s total sales, which came to a
consolidated ¥18.55 trillion14) in the fiscal year to March 2005. Its diversi-
fied operations include telecommunications and prefabricated housing.
*Total retail unit sales of Toyota/Lexus, Daihatsu and Hino vehicles.
Having somewhat briefly covered the history of Toyota let’s now look at what
makes Toyota tick so successfully.
3. The Toyota Way
This section is based on the work of Dr. Jeffrey K. Liker, which he published
in his 2004 book The Toyota Way. Liker is a Professor of Industrial and Opera-
The TF106
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Dr. Liker, Ph.D.
tions Engineering at the University of Michigan (Ann
Arbor) and has been studying Toyota for more than
twenty years.
The basic idea of Liker’s Toyota Way is that there is
much more to Toyota’s success than the commonly ac-
cepted view that it is due to the Toyota Production
System (TPS). As we shall see, the TPS is only a part
of the Toyota Way. Having just reviewed Toyota’s his-
tory we have already picked up some clues as to why Toyota has been successful
besides practicing its TPS. Take, for example, Sakichi Toyoda’s and son
Kiichiro’s belief in hard work and persistence, and that they should think long-
term and be contributing to the good of society. Take also the example of
Kiichiro accepting responsibility for the company’s troubles in 1950 and stepping
down from the presidency. Take also the almost heroic efforts that went into the
Lexus and Prius developments demonstrating Toyota’s stick-to-itiveness in tack-
ling the toughest problems until they are solved. These examples are but a few
reflecting the Toyota Way that has becoming the very fabric of the company’s
culture. We will now take a look at the fourteen principles that comprise Liker’s
Toyota Way.
To add some structure to these fourteen principles, Liker came up with his
“4P” model. This is shown in Figure 3. The 4Ps are: Philosophy, Process, People
& Partners, and Problem Solving.
Associated with each P is one or more principles thusly:
• Philosophy (Long-Term Thinking)
Principle 1: Base your management decisions on a long-term philosophy
even at the expense of short-term financial goals.
• Process (Eliminate Waste)
Principle 2: Create continuous process flow to bring problems to the
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Figure 3. The “4P” Model (from Liker, 2004, p. 6)
surface.
Principle 3: Use “pull” systems to avoid overproduction.
Principle 4: Level out the workload (heijunka). (Work like the tortoise,
not the hare.)
Principle 5: Build a culture of stopping to fix problems to get quality
right the first time.
Principle 6: Standardized tasks are the foundation for continuous im-
provement and employee empowerment.
Principle 7: Use visual controls so no problems are hidden.
Principle 8: Use only thoroughly tested technology that serves your
people and processes.
• People and Partners (Respect, Challenge, and Grow Them)
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Philosophy (Long-Term Thinking)—One principle
Principle 9: Grow leaders who thoroughly understand the work, live the
philosophy, and teach it to others.
Principle 10: Develop exceptional people and teams who follow your
company’s philosophy.
Principle 11: Respect your extended network of suppliers and partners by
challenging them and helping them improve.
• Problem Solving (Continuous Improvement and Learning)
Principle 12: Go and see for yourself to thoroughly understand the situa-
tion (genchi genbutsu).
Principle 13: Make decision slowly by consensus, thoroughly considering
all options; implement decisions quickly.
Principle 14: Become a learning organization through relentless reflection
(hansei) and continuous improvement (kaizen).
Let’s now learn more about each principle and see how it has contributed to
Toyota’s success. For a more succinct explanation of the principles see Liker’s
executive summary on pages 37 to 41 of his book.
Principle 1: Base your management decisions on a long-term philosophy even
at the expense of short-term financial goals. This principle says you should be
acting in such a way as to improve the
company as a whole, to bring value to
the customer and society, and to accept
responsibility for your own behavior.
Toyota’s seven guiding principles
(Appendix D) are evidence of this first
“Liker” principle. Liker said from the
numerous interviews he conducted for
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15) Executive Vice President and COO of Toyota Motor Sales in North America (at that
time anyway).
16) New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc.
his book the consistent message he got was that the purpose of the Toyota com-
pany was not short-term gain but looking beyond that to grow the company and
do what is right for employees, customers, and society. As Liker so well puts it:
Toyota’s strong sense of mission and commitment to its customers, employ-
ees, and society is the foundation for all the other principles and the miss-
ing ingredient in most companies trying to emulate Toyota. (p. 72, empha-
sis in the original)
Everything Toyota does reflects this commitment to the company and society.
It isn’t trying to simply make a lot of money but to make itself better so it can do
more for its employees, customers, partners, and society as a whole, sort of a “vi-
cious circle” but a good one!
Liker gives numerous examples. One is from an interview with Jim Press15)
who used to work for Ford before coming to Toyota. His experience at Ford was
one of chronic customer complaints whereas once he came to Toyota: “In con-
trast, Toyota is aligned around satisfying the customer. It felt like I finally had
found a home” (as quoted in Liker, p. 73).
Another example is the way Toyota took a failed GM plant in Fremont, Cali-
fornia and, with persistence, turned it into one of best plants in America,
NUMMI16), thus restoring jobs and contributing to the economy.
Toyota has always believed in taking responsibility for its own problems.
The thought of a government bailout would seem very strange to a company
like Toyota. Toyota has faced and overcome many challenges in its past such
as its initial efforts to build cars that would compete with the likes of GM and
Ford with it’s then meager resources. Such difficulties prompted the ideas of
“just-in-time” and “pull.” Another example is how Toyota managed to pull
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Process (Eliminate Waste)—Seven principles
17) And probably far too often forgotten about as new products are developed.
through its financial crisis in the 1950s. As Liker notes, even the relatively iso-
lated location of Toyota in the Nagoya countryside shows a penchant for not
relying on others.
As opposed to what is too often the case with other companies, Toyota’s seven
guiding principles (Appendix D) are not just window dressing but something the
company lives and breathes each day. Truly Toyota practices the Deming first
point (Appendix B): Point 1: Create constancy of purpose towards improvement
of product and service, with the aim to become competitive and to stay in busi-
ness, and to provide jobs.
Principle 2: Create continuous process flow to bring problems to the surface.
Continuous flow is the opposite of traditional batch and queue. Companies often
believe they can be the most efficient by
making or working on as many of the
same part as possible at the same time;
i.e., taking advantage of the economies of
scale. Therefore a traditional manufactur-
ing company might have separate depart-
ments for stamping, welding, assembly,
etc. As Liker points out (p. 91) once you
have set up your operation this way the next question is how do you move these
batches from one department to another, and when? This means you need another
system to plan all this, which also means adding to the non-value adding bureau-
cracy. And, worse yet you have generated a massive amount of work-in-process
(WIP) inventory that is just sitting around waiting to be moved/used17) and con-
Papers of the Research Society of Commerce and Economics, Vol. XXXXVII No. 1
132 ――
Figure 5. The U-shaped one-piece flow cell (continuous flow) (from Liker, 2004, p. 98)
Figure 4. Organization by machine type with convoluted flow (batch and queue)
(from Liker, 2004, p. 97)
suming valuable space and capital. Figures 4 and 5 from Liker illustrate the dif-
ference between a batch and queue set up and a continuous flow set up.
As can be seen in Figure 5, the ideal “batch” size is one. Furthermore, con-
tinuous flow operates on the principle of “pull.” This means a part/operation
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18) In reality, depending on the lead time for the upstream part, some buffer inventory
may be required.
upstream is only made/performed when the next downstream operation places
the demand for it. Thus, in an ideal setup, all inventory is eliminated18).
As pointed out in Liker (pp. 95-96) these are the benefits of continuous flow:
• Improves quality since a part is moved one at a time forcing the operation
receiving the part to ensure it is OK. When there is a lot of inventory from
which an operation is working it is too easy (and human nature) to just
toss the bad part and grab another. Then whatever caused that bad part
never gets addressed.
• Improves flexibility since the order-to-delivery cycle time is much shorter
and, if the customer’s needs change, it becomes much easier to respond to
the change.
• Improves productivity since it is much easier to determine exactly how
many resources (people, machines, etc.) are needed when you are making
just what’s needed.
• Frees up all that floor space that was wasted holding, as Liker puts it,
“piles and piles” of inventory.
• Improves safety since smaller amounts of material are being moved. This
means less chance of lifting strain and accidents involving the equipment
needed for moving large batches (such as forklift trucks).
• Improves morale because the workers can see better that what they’re do-
ing is truly value-adding and not just churning out hundreds of parts with-
out really knowing why.
• Reduces the cost of inventory as already discussed.
Principle 3: Use “pull” systems to avoid overproduction. In the ideal one-
piece flow an operation does not get what it needs from the next upstream opera-
tion until it calls for it, in other words there is zero WIP inventory between op-
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Applying this idea to manufacturing, the question became how to best signal
the source of supplies for any operation when more supplies are needed. Thus
was born the famous kanban system. A kanban is simply some device to signal
the next upstream supply source that more of whatever it supplies is needed.
Kanban in Japanese means card and a card of some sort is usually used along
with a standard size container for that particular item. Figure 6 illustrates the
kanban concept. At the far right an operator is using up parts from a standard-
ized container. Once those parts are used up, the empty container, along with it
“parts retrieval kanban” goes back to a nearby replenishment store for refilling
and return to the operator. Of course while this replenishment is going on another
erations. This is called “pull” because the
operation is “pulling” what it needs ver-
sus having it being “pushed” on to it for
use. As mentioned, in a traditional batch
and queue operation a lot of parts are
made or processed at the same time and
then placed in an inventory and moved to
wherever they’ll be used next waiting to
be used. Obviously this creates a lot of waste. Although in a mass production
system, such as Toyota’s, it is not possible to have perfect one-piece flow, the
idea of pull is applied to the maximum extent possible.
The idea for this, as the story goes, came when Taiichi Ohno visited the U.S.
in the 1950s and became fascinated by the way supermarkets operated. Instead
of a lot of inventory being held by these stores, the customer was “signaling”
what should be bought from the wholesalers and when it should be bought. This
“signal” was simply how much of each item was bought requiring it to be replen-
ished to the shelf. Another example Liker gives is the gas gauge in our car sig-
naling us when it’s time to fill up.
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19) Or however many are needed, but the number should be as small as possible to keep
that inventory down.
20) See Principle 4 next.
container19) is in the system to allow the operation to continue.
In turn, as the replenishment store’s stock goes down and reaches a certain
level, a “production instruction kanban” is triggered and sent back to the pro-
ducer for producing a certain amount to be sent to the replenishment store. This
is shown on the left side of Figure 6. Of course not all production facilities are
so close that such precisely timed replenishment can occur. Therefore some parts
must be moved in larger quantities on a scheduled basis, for example parts com-
ing from overseas. However, even these replenishments should be as often as
practical to minimize inventory.
As Liker points out it is not simply an “either/or” situation but where possible
a kanban pull system is used and even that should be as streamlined as possible
by, for example, trying to minimize what’s held in the buffer replenishment
stores and the amount of material moving between sources and destinations. The
idea is not to set up an elaborate kanban system but to eliminate waste. The
kanban is simply the means to do this, not an end it itself!
To show how this pull principle works within Toyota, Liker (pp 108–109.)
describes how it starts with the customer, just like the supermarkets:
Orders accumulate from car dealerships. Production control creates a lev-
eled schedule20). For example, they make a white Camry, followed by a
green Camry, followed by a red Avalon, and so on. Each of these cars has a
whole set of options associated with it. That schedule is sent to the body
shop, where stamped steel panels (from a “supermarket” of pre-stamped
panels) are welded together into a body…. …At a certain trigger point when
a certain number of steel panels have been used by the body shop, a kanban
goes back to the stamping press, ordering it to make another batch to replen-
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ish the store.
Similarly, when assembly line workers begin to use parts from bins
(hinges, door handles, windshield wipers), they take out a kanban card and
put it in a mailbox. A material handler will come on a timed route and pick
it up and go back to a store to replenish what is used on the assembly line.
Another material handler will replenish the store based on parts from a su-
permarket of supplier parts. This will trigger an order back to parts suppli-
ers. And so on.
Although Figure 6 makes it appear to be a simple matter, when you take into
account that a car has thousands of parts and each car is different, the develop-
ment, maintenance, and continual efforts to improve Toyota’s pull system repre-
sent a remarkable feat. But this is not to say other manufacturers can’t also do it,
and many have, recognizing the great payoff in reducing costs and cycle times
and increased customer satisfaction.
Principle 4: Level Out the Workload (Heijunka). When we discussed creating
flow (Principle 2), several benefits were listed. Another way to describe the ben-
efits of flow is that it helps eliminate waste and this is the whole purpose of lean
manufacturing. According to Liker (p. 89) there are eight “non-value-adding”
wastes:
• Overproduction
• Waiting
• Unnecessary transport
• Overprocessing
• Excess inventory
• Unnecessary movement
• Defects
• Unused employee creativity
The Japanese word for waste is muda. Principle 4 is concerned with two other
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“M’s”: muri and mura. Muri is overburdening your people and machines and
mura is unevenness. Although in the process of going lean a company is trying
to get the most out of its processes, this doesn’t mean pushing those processes
beyond their natural capability (muri). However, this is what usually happens in
a company because of the unevenness (mura) that exists.
Say a company is making two products, a fairly large and complicated one and
a less expensive, simpler one. The time and effort required to make the more
complicated model will always be greater than the time and effort required for
the simpler one. Therefore, when there is strong customer demand for one model
or the other the manufacturing process will either be overburdened or under bur-
dened. That is, when trying to meet demand for the more complicated model ev-
ery worker and machine will be overworked and when the demand shifts to the
simpler model there will probably be a lot of “free time.” This is especially true
for “build-to-order” type of operations. In such cases companies will often have
a lot of the most popular products being held in expensive finished product in-
ventory.
Another reason for this unevenness is companies tend to build a lot of one
model at a time due to the time it takes to set up the tools and equipment for
another model. Primarily based on the pioneering work of Shigeo Shingo who
worked closely with Toyota, previous setup times that were measured in hours
are now measured in mere minutes. A lot of this was accomplished by carefully
studying what was required to effect the changeover—for example of a large
stamping press—and doing as much of it as possible while the press was
still operating. It turns out that often there are only a few things that still need to
be done to affect the changeover thus allowing it to be accomplished quickly.
To minimize mura and thus minimize muri and the muda it causes, Toyota
practices heijunka. Heijunka means leveling to even out the workload as much as
possible. This is also known as “balancing the line” and, according to Scholl &
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Klein (2006), for mixed model assembly lines such as Toyota’s, a key factor is
solving the model-sequencing problem. This means finding “a sequence of all
model units to be produced such that inefficiencies (work overload, line stop-
page, off-line repair, etc.) are minimized.” Given Toyota’s ability to meticulously
plan everything, they have essentially solved this problem. Toyota’s ability to
quickly affect changeovers also greatly contributes to heijunka.
One of the benefits of this line leveling is the stabilizing affect it has on the
whole supply chain. When a supplier knows he or she can almost always depend
on the schedule planned by Toyota, their operation too becomes “evener” as does
that of his or her suppliers in turn, etc.
Although heijunka may entail making some customers wait a little longer for
the particular car they want, the net effect benefits everyone. However, even with
heijunka in place, Toyota has been working to make it possible for dealers to call
in with “last minute” changes so that many times any change “except for the ba-
sic body type” can be accommodated (Liker, p. 122).
One way to think of heijunka is like the race between the tortoise and the hare.
As quoted from Ohno (1988) in Liker (p. 115):
The slower but consistent tortoise causes less waste and is much more
desirable than the speedy hare that races ahead and then stops occasionally
to doze. The Toyota Production System can be realized only when all the
workers become tortoises.
Principle 5: Build a culture of stopping
to fix problems to get quality right the
first time. According to Liker, the tradi-
tional approach to manufacturing by com-
panies like GM and Ford has been to keep
the assembly line running at all costs. On
the surface this seems to make sense.
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However, it also causes and hides a lot of problems since to expect a complicated
operation such as an automobile assembly line to operate problem-free for any
length of time really makes no sense. Therefore Toyota goes to great lengths to
create an operation that can stop when there is a problem. The idea is to not only
prevent bad product but also solve the problem, be it a temporary aberration or
something that could cause long-term quality problems.
This building of a system that has the inherent ability to prevent bad quality
from being produced goes back to Toyota’s automatic loom origins when Sakichi
Toyoda invented a loom that would automatically stop if a thread broke. The
Japanese term is jidoka and, along with just-in-time, is considered one of the two
“pillars” of the TPS. The elements of jidoka are:
• Devices built into the machine or system to prevent a wrong operation or
to stop the process or cause a signal to occur when a problem occurs.
• Employees who are authorized to stop an operations when they notice a
problem.
• Employees who are trained on how to respond to stoppages (e.g., a team
leader who will quickly help an assembly line worker).
• Standardized work procedures.
Devices to either prevent a wrong operation or alert the operator when one has
occurred are called poka-yoke or, in English parlance, fail-safe devices. There are
many examples such as the third prong on most U.S. electrical plugs meant to
ensure it is inserted so a proper ground occurs. Liker gives the example of a cer-
tain cotter pin that needs to be inserted in assembling an axel. A light curtain
must be passed through when reaching for the cotter pin. If this doesn’t happen a
light goes on. Signals such as this are called andon and are used throughout
Toyota. An andon is simply a signaling device and could be a light or an audible
signal. For example, above the Toyota assembly lines are light boards that will
light up to show which work station is having a problem so the team leader can
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Figure 7. An assembly line with andon lights and work stoppage buttons (Liker,
2004, p. 131)
quickly attend to that problem.
The line worker usually activates these andon lights on Toyota’s assembly
lines when he or she sees a problem. Furthermore when activated the assembly
line is temporarily stopped. The worker is not only authorized to stop the line but
also is expected to do so—almost the ultimate empowerment. At the same time a
highly trained team leader will immediately step in to assess the situation and
take whatever action is required. Figure 7 shows how this works and Liker de-
scribes how it applies to a Toyota assembly line:
The team leader has until the vehicle moves into the next workstation zone
to respond, before the andon turns red [from white] and the line segment
automatically stops. This is likely to be a matter of 15–30 seconds… In that
time the team leader might immediately fix the problem or note it can be
fixed while the car is moving into other workstations and push the button
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again, canceling out the line stoppage. Or the team leader might conclude
that the line should be stopped. (p. 131)
However, since the line is divided up into segments with buffer in between, up
to 10 minutes could pass before the entire line has to stop. As Liker says, this
rarely happens. When I visited a Toyota plant recently I noticed while we were
watching an assembly line that the andon lights were often coming on but
almost as often they were quickly turned off as each “problem” was quickly
attended to.
The final element of a good jidoka system is standardized work. This applies
not only to how problems are responded to but also to each operation on the
assembly line. In fact the two are related since should a new problem spring up
that hasn’t been encountered before, the first step will probably be to carefully
review the way the operation in question is presently being performed—without
standardized work procedures this would be impossible. After a careful analysis
of the existing procedure and why it failed, the necessary changes to it can be
made.
So the idea of jidoka and building quality into the product by ensuring any
problems are immediately nipped in the bud has many benefits. These include
ensuring extremely high-quality product, making each worker feel like he or she
really is making a difference, encouraging and letting everyone continually prac-
tice problem solving, and creating a cul-
ture that says “problems will occur, let’s
work together to solve them and not
waste time blaming people!”
Principle 6: Standardized tasks are the
foundation for continuous improvement
and employee empowerment. When we
think of standardized work we think of
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some controlling, all knowing bureaucracy that develops the standards and
imposes them on the poor worker. Such was the legacy of Fredrick Taylor whose
well-intentioned efforts to get more out of each worker often made the job so
onerous that the worker resisted to the point where any gains were wiped out by
this resistance. At Toyota the emphasis is not on “control” but on “empower-
ment.” Toyota too has a bureaucracy but one whose purpose is to support the
worker by ensuring that the work standards are “best practice standards” versus
coercive “performance standards.”
The philosophy behind Toyota work standards is you can’t improve something
if it isn’t stable. Liker uses the example of improving a golfer’s swing; if he or
she has not yet learned to swing consistently, it will not be possible to improve
it. Similarly, if a certain way of doing something on the assembly line hasn’t
been standardized so it is always done the same way, it won’t be possible to
move to an improved level.
And this improvement is largely left to those doing the work since they are in
the best position to know how to improve it. However, Liker also mentions what
happens when something appears to go wrong during normal operations: the
standardized procedure will be checked to see if it was followed. If it was, then
the team/group leader will watch as the worker goes through the procedure to see
what needs changing.
But the idea of letting the worker him or herself make improvements is very
empowering and is probably the reason Toyota gets so many useful suggestions
from its workforce21). This is one way Toyota encourages its employees to fol-
low its motto: Good Thinking, Good Products. Also, by having the workers write
and improve the standards ensures they will be in a “language” that the worker
can understand.
21) Toyota has a very active suggestion program and implements the vast majority of
them!
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22) And probably some in Japan.
23) As an aside, on page 104 Liker has a great Taiichi Ohno quote: “The more inventory
a company has,... the less likely they will have what they need.”
Recognizing the great variation in type of tasks, from those that are highly
repetitive to those less so (like design work), Toyota strives to find the proper
balance for each task. For the highly repetitive tasks the standards will be very
detailed, for those at the other end of the spectrum there will be more room for
individual initiative in doing the task. However, it must be again emphasized that
even for the detailed standards, the worker is empowered and expected to come
up with improvements to it reflecting a culture that says “you’re important and
we want to know what you think will make our company better.”
Principle 7: Use visual controls so no
problems are hidden. Liker starts talking
about this principle by describing how
most companies outside Japan22) operated:
with “piles and piles of inventory stacked
to the roof ” so you couldn’t see if every-
thing was where it should be23) or if the
work was being performed as it should.
This resulted in a problem being hidden until the company is forced to address
it. And, by that time, the problem was so serious it had become a crisis. In fact,
“crisis management was the accepted mentality of the day” (p. 149).
Liker quotes Fujio Cho, a recent president of Toyota, about how Taiichi Ohno,
the “father” of TPS felt about visual control:
Mr. Ohno was passionate about TPS. He said you must clean up everything
so you can see problems. He would complain if he could not look and see
and tell if there is a problem. (p. 149)
It is safe to say you can’t have a good lean system without good visual controls.
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24) In other words: “A place for everything and everything in its place.” Tool shadow
boards are an example.
Visual controls could be anything that helps you see if things are where they
should be and the work is being performed as it should. For example, a good lean
system will include the practice of 5S. The five S’s are: sort, straighten, shine,
standardize, and sustain. Sort what is needed in the work place from what’s not
needed and get rid of what’s not needed. Straighten up what’s needed, for
example by arranging all the tools at a work station in a way so the worker
knows where each tool is and knows immediately if a tool is not there.24) Con-
tinually shine up everything to keep tools, equipment, and the work area clean
and well-working and to be able to quickly detect any problems such as leaky
pipes. Have standards for carrying out the first three S’s and periodic audits to
sustain and constantly improve the 5S system.
Some other visual controls include the use of kanban cards to tell when a bin
needs filling, markings on the plant floor to show where WIP or a parts bin
should be placed, and—as discussed under Principle 5—andon lights and stan-
dard work procedures. The standard work procedures are posted at each worksta-
tion and are the current best practices for that work.
As Liker puts it: “In essence, Toyota uses an integrated set of visual controls
or a visual control system designed to create a transparent and waste-free envi-
ronment” (p. 153). Such a system allows the supervisor to walk through an area
and immediately tell if the work is being performed as it should or if any prob-
lems exist.
Liker gives several examples of how a good visual control system can greatly
improve an operation. For example a process control board at a Toyota parts dis-
tribution center in Kentucky allows almost minute by minute monitoring of a
highly sophisticated picking operation thus making the operation very efficient.
Another example is in the area of product development that started with the
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25) However, in some cases where it makes sense, electronic kanbans are being used.
26) Often such new technology soon falls into disuse because it is deemed more trouble
than it is worth (“act in haste, repent in at leisure”).
Lexus development. For a new development Toyota now sets up an obeya (large
room) where everything relevant to that development is displayed: schedules,
design graphics, manpower charts, financial status, quality information, etc. Also
the chief engineer and his/her key people work out of this room. Such a system
provides everyone involved a full picture of what’s going on at any time. It also
facilitates coordination among the various functions eliminating a lot of previous
waste in “transporting” information from one function to another.
It is interesting that most visual controls are manual systems such as the
kanban25) and obeya. With the remarkable advances in computer technology and
the advent of the Internet and intranets it is tempting to try and do more visual
controlling with this technology. However, as Liker notes, such can often have
unintended consequences. For example when some visual control requires a per-
son to log on to a computer to see it there is a good chance that will never hap-
pen. Often a tried and true manual system that makes the visual control plainly
visible to everyone is the best.
Principle 8: Use only thoroughly tested technology that serves your people
and processes. Toyota believes in adopting new technology but only to the ex-
tent it truly supports its people and pro-
cesses. Too often a company will be en-
ticed into adopting some new technology
based on the vendor’s promises of how
much more efficient it will make some
process or operation26). Liker gives the
example of an American auto parts sup-
plier that felt its operation would be
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greatly improved by adopting software that allowed anyone real time visibility of
inventory in the supply chain (p. 161). The object was to increase its inventory
turns. As Liker pointed out to the company, just knowing what was in the supply
chain without actually doing anything to reduce inventory27) would not help.
And, in fact, Liker later proved this by cutting inventory by 80% at one of their
plants without any information technology.
Contrast this with the way Toyota’s service parts operation views technology.
As Liker states it:
…they continue to use an old software system developed in house years ago
under much simpler circumstances. It has continuously evolved over the
years and does exactly what is needed today. (p. 161)
Typically, when Toyota is considering adopting new technology it will first
study the process that will be affected and be sure that everything possible has
been done without that technology to make the process efficient. Then a pilot
program will be carefully run to ensure the new technology really will signifi-
cantly improve the process without distracting the worker(s) involved. In other
words, the new technology must truly add value to the process and make it easier
for the worker(s) to do a good job. In some cases the new technology will be
adapted to meet Toyota’s specific needs versus being adopted wholesale. An ex-
ample given by Liker is when Toyota decided to consider using CATIA28) and in
the event customized it to “fit their development process.” Toyota’s adoption of
CATIA is also an example of how thoroughly it studies technology before mak-
ing that final decision since, according to Liker, it was only “after two years of
thinking and debating” that Toyota decided to make the shift. The bottom-line is
will the new technology really support Toyota’s people and processes.
27) Such as introducing a kanban system.
28) Computer-Aided Three-Dimensional Interactive Application—CAD software that is
now considered “the auto industry benchmark.”
Papers of the Research Society of Commerce and Economics, Vol. XXXXVII No. 1
148 ――
The continuation and promotion of traditional values such as these provide
Toyota the stability it needs to be a true learning organization and progress to the
next level of excellence. Contrast this with organizations that are up one day and
then in the doldrums the next, requiring the next drastic shakeup, maybe by
bringing in a “turn around artist.”
The idea of a learning organization also means Toyota places a genuine value
on its people. Figure 8 is Liker’s view of how Toyota leadership differs from
other companies and how it focuses on building a true learning organization by
People and Partners (Respect, Challenge, and Grow Them)—Three principles
Principle 9: Grow leaders who thor-
oughly understand the work, live the phi-
losophy, and teach it to others. When
compared to most other major auto-
makers, Toyota top leaders are quite dif-
ferent. Most of the others tend to bring in
outsiders, often for the purpose of “turn-
ing the company around.” A case in point
is Carlos Ghosn of Nissan. Toyota believes in growing its leaders from within.
For example the current president, Katsuaki Watanabe, who took over in early
2005, oversaw procurement and business development at the time of being named
to that post. He also came with experience in production and corporate planning
(Toyota Names New, 2005). In fact Watanabe represents a continuation of a long
line of such presidents dating from the founder, Kiichiro Toyoda. What is most sig-
nificant about this line is how it has preserved the traditional values that actually
started with Kiichiro’s father, Sakichi. These are such things as hard work, having
first-hand knowledge of the work, and making customer satisfaction and the good
of society important priorities.
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29) More on this at Principle 14.
the way it treats its people29). The bureaucratic manager has little understanding
of the value-added work being done and leads by enforcing the rules. The group
facilitator may be a great motivator but can he or she really provide that much
guidance on how to do the job. There is probably little respect for either of these
leaders—one a “command and control” type and the other a “feel gooder”—both
know less than the workers about what’s really going on. The task master is the
micro-manager who does know what’s going on but has little faith in the work-
ers, directing their almost every move and again, probably getting little respect.
The Toyota leader operates mostly in the fourth quadrant: the builder of
learning organizations. He or she not only knows what’s going on because of
having “been there,” but also is firmly committed to the Toyota Way of doing
Figure 8. Liker’s Toyota leadership model (p. 181)
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things and seeks to pass this on to his or her subordinates. As shown by the
shading in Figure 8 sometimes it is necessary to operate in the other three
quadrants depending on the situation. Liker sums up the common traits of
Toyota’s past great leaders:
• Focused on a long-term purpose for Toyota as a value-added contributor
to society.
• Never deviated from the precepts of the Toyota Way DNA and lived and
modeled themselves around this for all to see.
• Worked their way up doing the detailed work and continued to go to the
gemba—the actual place where the real value-added work is done.
• Saw problems as opportunities to train and coach their people. (p. 182)
Such leaders are respected for both their knowledge of the business and lead-
ership abilities. As opposed to the bureaucratic manager or task master they sel-
dom give orders. Instead they ask people questions to encourage them to think
problems through themselves and thus learn so the whole organization becomes
better.
Principle 10: Develop exceptional people and teams who follow your
company’s philosophy. Toyota believes that you cannot get exceptional teams
without hiring and training exceptional people. Liker relates how employees were
selected for a new service parts facility in Hebron, Kentucky. Out of a total of
13,500 applicants for the 275 jobs a sub-
set of randomly selected applicants was
chosen to attend a job fair. At the job fair
these applicants were further screened and
given information about Toyota. Finally,
based on the job fair, certain applicants
were invited to undergo three one-hour
interview meetings.
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Figure 9. Toyota’s “bottom-down” hierarchy (from Liker, p. 192 [original source: Bill
Constantino, former group leader, Toyota, Georgetown, Kentucky])
In the year leading up to the launch of the new facility only some of the jobs
were filled to form a design team to develop the operational process and begin
learning the Toyota Way. This cadre of workers was also used to help select ad-
ditional “associates” as the operation gradually ramped up.
The point is that rather than immediately begin a full-fledged operation, the
Hebron launch was well thought out and gradual to ensure not only the best
people were selected but also that there was enough time to, in effect, build the
culture first. This began with the job fair where information was given out about
Toyota and how it does things, through to the training and assimilation of more
and more associates as the launch progressed. No doubt, Hebron is a model of
how Toyota wishes to bring on board not only the best and brightest but also
those who will share its traditional values and make good team members.
In most organizations the hierarchy is top-down, in Toyota it is “bottom-
down”; that is, the team members are considered the most important people since
they are the ones adding value for the customer on the assembly line. Figure 9
shows this along with typical spans of control. At first glance the excessive num-
ber of group and team leaders would seem a waste of manpower. However, com-
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pared with most companies, these team and group leaders are not just standing
or sitting around to “supervise” the work but have many specifically assigned
duties all designed to provide maximum support to the team members doing the
work. And not least of these is to fill in for a team member when necessary or be
ready to aid assistance when a problem arises. As mentioned earlier, each team
member has the authority—and responsibility—to stop the line when a problem
arises. This signals the team leader who is immediately available to lend assis-
tance or make a decision about what to do. And, from my recent experience of
visiting a Toyota plant, it was apparent from all the times the andon lights came
on that these team leaders were kept busy and earning their pay.
Liker (pp. 194–197) describes how Toyota firmly believes in the various moti-
vation theories such as the Maslow and Hertzberg “internal” theories and the “ex-
ternal” theories of Taylor and Skinner. However, there is much more to develop-
ing exceptional people and teams than simply trying to apply these theories. It
requires building a culture that integrates your technical and social systems and
is based on a consistent set of principles and this is something that takes years.
As far as motivation, Liker sums it up well:
People must have a degree of security and feel they belong to a team. You
must design jobs to be challenging. People need some autonomy to feel they
have control over the job. Moreover, there seems to be nothing as motivat-
ing as challenging targets, constant
measurement and feedback on pro-
gress, and an occasional reward thro-
wn in. (p. 198)
And this also sums up well the way
Toyota develops and treats its people.
Principle 11: Respect your extended
network of suppliers and partners by
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challenging them and helping them improve. It doesn’t take a “rocket scientist”
to realize that if you want a quality product you must use quality supplies. This
was one of Deming’s Fourteen Points (Appendix B): Point 4: End the practice
of awarding business on the basis of price tag. Instead, minimize total cost. Move
toward a single supplier for any one item, on a long-term relationship of loyalty
and trust.
The importance of having a close relationship with your suppliers can be ap-
preciated even more when you consider the thousands of parts that go into each
car and the diversity of these parts depending on the car model (at last count
Toyota makes some 80 different models). Then add in the need to have as many
of these parts arrive “just-in-time” to many places all over the world. When
viewed this way it becomes obvious that Toyota’s suppliers are very special to
Toyota’s success and Toyota treats them accordingly.
As Liker points out, Toyota came by this idea of having a special relationship
with its suppliers honestly since in its early days it simply didn’t have the vol-
ume that would normally attract a supplier. What it could offer was a chance to
grow together with Toyota. As Liker puts it:
So, like the associates who work inside Toyota, suppliers became part of the
extended family who grew and learned the Toyota Production System. (p.
202)
And once a supplier has proved itself by meeting Toyota’s tough standards it is
“not kicked out except for the most egregious behavior.”
Toyota works closely with its suppliers to help them learn and practice the
TPS and, hopefully, even some of the Toyota Way. One such effort is the Toyota
Supplier Support Center (TSSC) established in 1992 in the U.S. (Erlanger, Ken-
tucky). Although originally its services were free, TSSC has become a pay-for-
service consulting firm. TSSC operates on a project basis, going into a company
and, over a period of several months setting up a model assembly line based on
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Problem Solving (Continuous Improvement and Learning)—Three principles
the principles of the TPS.
According to Liker another way Toyota supports its suppliers is by closely
monitoring and rating them. A rating of “one” means the supplier has completely
shut down due, say, to its plant burning down; a “five” is exemplary. If a sup-
plier puts a Toyota assembly plant in danger of shutting down it is rated “two”
and this happens:
Toyota will then send in a team of people swarming through the supplier’s
plant and the supplier must develop an action plan to address all of their con-
cerns. A level two typically means severe probation for a year. (pp. 212–213)
But note that the supplier is not simply chastised or dropped as might happen
with other major automakers, but helped to recover to again begin meeting
Toyota’s high standards. Again we see this general theme in the way Toyota
operates: working with its partners to solve the problem not wasting time on the
“blame game.” This is the way it works with its employees too. And, in the end,
everyone wins with better suppliers and better employees.
As Toyota continues to refine the way it develops and supports its suppliers,
bringing them closer and closer to the ideal of not just the TPS but the Toyota
Way, we see the what Jeffrey Liker believes is a unique achievement: “…an ex-
tended learning enterprise. This is, to me, the highest form of the lean enterprise”
(p. 217).
Principle 12: Go and see for yourself to thoroughly understand the situation
(genchi genbutsu). On the surface this principle seems very simple even though
it may not be practiced that much by most companies. It reminds me of another
management “rule”: manage by walking around; that is, don’t stay in your office
all day but get out and see what’s really going on. However, for Toyota this prin-
ciple is considered throughout the company as what most distinguishes its man-
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agement approach from that of other com-
panies (Liker, p. 223).
And, in its full realization, genchi
genbutsu is far from simply going and
seeing. Liker quotes the president of the
Toyota Technical Center (TTC), Tadashi
Yamashina30) (p. 224): “It is more than
going and seeing. ‘What happened? What
30) At least at the time Liker’s book came out.
did you see? What are the issues? What are the problems?’” To practice what
Toyota calls “deep” genchi genbutsu requires years of training and practice, and
is expected of all employees. The practice entails not just observing the situation
but analyzing it in terms of what problems might exist and what might be their
causes based on your knowledge and experience. This need to have sufficient
prerequisite knowledge and experience is why acquiring the ability to practice
really “deep” genchi genbutsu may take years to acquire.
All this is not to say data doesn’t have its palace, but data alone will usually not
tell the whole story and should be used with genchi genbutsu, not in place of it. An
example of this in Liker is a story told by David Baxter, a vice president at TTC30.
One of his early assignments was visiting a testing lab Toyota was thinking about
using. The purpose of the visit was to see exactly how that lab carried out the test-
ing by giving them a sample test that had already been run by Toyota. According
to Baxter, they got the “right answer” but by doing genchi genbutsu, Toyota found
out the lab wasn’t doing the test to Toyota standards. Had Toyota simply accepted
the results data without going to the lab it would have said this lab’s OK even
though the test was not up to Toyota’s high standards.
A simpler example of genchi genbutsu related by Liker is the major redesign
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31) An American program manager from TTC assisted him.
of the Sienna minivan in 2004. Since it was targeted at the U.S., Canada, and
Mexico, the chief engineer on this project, Yuji Yokoya, decided to go and see
for himself just what it was like to drive such a vehicle in those places. In fact
his goal was to drive in every U.S. state and in Canada and Mexico. As Liker re-
lates it:
Yokoya achieved his goal of driving in every single U.S. state, including
Alaska and Hawaii, and every part of Canada and Mexico. In most cases
they31) were able to rent a Toyota Sienna, looking for ways to improve it. As
a result, he made many design changes that would make no sense to a Japa-
nese engineer living in Japan.
For example improving “drift” control due to the roads in Canada having a
higher crown than those in America, and incorporating a flip-up tray the driver
can use to hold food since Americans often eat in their cars as opposed to the
Japanese who usually stop to eat.
Liker gives several other examples of genchi genbutsu, but the bottom line is
you can’t really fully appreciate what’s going on, be it a specific problem that’s
cropped up or the day-by-day operation for which you are responsible, without
going to the scene and seeing for yourself—and that “seeing” should be based on
already knowing enough to recognize any problems and what their causes might
be. It also means taking nothing for
granted and not relying on the reports of
others (although they should be taken into
account).
Principle 13: Make decision slowly by
consensus, thoroughly considering all op-
tions; implement decisions quickly. Alex
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32) Called “set-based concurrent engineering.”
Warren, a former Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky VP, contrasts the way
Toyota makes decisions with the way they are made in a typical American com-
pany. Say there’s a project that is to be fully implemented in a year. The Ameri-
can company will begin implementing in three months but spend the rest of the
year correcting problems.
Toyota will spend nine to 10 months planning, then implement in a small
way—such as with pilot production—and be fully implemented at the end
of the year, with virtually no remaining problems. (Warren quoted in Liker,
p. 237)
It is another case of Toyota believing in the wisdom of the slow but steady
approach of the “tortoise” versus the herky-jerky approach of the “hare.”
According to Liker there are five major elements to Toyota’s decision making:
• Find out what’s really going on—the situation—including the use of
genchi genbutsu.
• Fully understand the problem (e.g., by asking “why” five times).
• Consider all possible alternatives and develop a rationale for the preferred
one.
• Build consensus with all possible stakeholders both inside and outside of
Toyota.
• Use very efficient communications to accomplish the first four elements.
We’ve already covered the importance of understanding the situation in Prin-
ciple 12, and Principle 14 will address the second element. The third element is
paradoxical in a way since Toyota is famous for it ability to develop a car faster
than anyone yet its engineers are trained to take the time “to think in sets of al-
ternative solutions” (p. 240) which include not only the engineering of the car but
the manufacturing system needed to make it.32) Liker notes some examples from
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Another thing that contributes to a smoother and speedier implementation once
the decision is made is nemawashi. Nemawashi is common in Japan and means
discussing a decision with all concerned before the decision is made to get con-
sensus (the fourth element). Often these discussions will be informal but a for-
mal request for a proposal to be reviewed could also be part of the nemawashi
process. With Toyota the purpose of nemawashi is twofold: to not only get the
person’s agreement but, even more important, to see if that person has something
to contribute that will result in a better decision. And it is important not to leave
anyone out who could have an interest in the decision. This is pointed out in a
quote on page 248 of Liker:
For some decisions I may think I already know the answer and do not need
input from others. There may be a department that is not directly involved
and I think they probably do not have much to contribute. I may in fact find
the right answer on my own, but I will have a hard time presenting it be-
cause the group I skipped will challenge my recommendations… (Andy
Lund, PM for 2004 Sienna)
The fifth element means communicating in a clear and concise way to accom-
plish the other four elements. Toyota has come up with what it calls the A3 re-
port. The idea is to place all relevant information about a decision to be made on
an A3 size sheet (297 ¥ 420 mm). In American terms this would be about the
size of two letter-size sheets side by side. This may seem very restrictive since
we think of a typical company report outlining a major decision as consisting of
the tightly scheduled Prius development; for example, the hybrid engine technol-
ogy started with 80 different alternative approaches that were eventually nar-
rowed down to ten and then four. These four were then carefully evaluated re-
sulting in a final solution that was confidently selected as the best. The point is
that all this takes time but, in the end, results in faster developments since all the
details have been worked out beforehand for a sound final decision.
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33) Akin to an individual getting to the top of Maslow’s hierarchy: self-actualization.
many pages in a loose-leaf binder. However such a format also means those who
must “sign off ” on it will have to take a lot of time to digest all those pages or,
worse yet, give it a perfunctory look since “they simply didn’t have the time to
read it all.”
Restricting the size of the decision paper to an A3 size also forces the action
person to understand the situation/problem so well he or she can get everything
important down on one sheet. Figure 19-2 on page 245 in Liker shows an actual
A3 report and what is probably a typical presentation format: current situation,
proposal, labor cost & time analysis, plan, implementation, controls, and
timeline. Indeed, if all these points have been thoroughly addressed and fully co-
ordinated through nemawashi, it is likely the final decision will go quickly and
smoothly. In fact Liker says the Figure 19-2 proposal was given final approval in
less than five minutes at the executive board meeting.
In sum, Toyota’s way of making decisions ensures all possible alternatives
have been considered, ensures all potential interests are heard from and, sort of
serendipitously, contributes to Toyota’s goal of being a true learning organization
since all the work that must happen before the decision requires a lot of learning
to take place. And this brings us to the last of the fourteen principles: becoming
a learning organization.
Principle 14: Become a learning orga-
nization through relentless reflection
(hansei) and continuous improvement
(kaizen). It is probably with good reason
Liker lists this principle last because be-
coming such an organization must surely
be the ultimate accomplishment33). When
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34) At least at the time the book was published.
Peter Senge wrote about the idea of a “learning organization” in his famous
book, The Fifth Discipline, in 1990 it was considered a breakthrough in thinking.
However, as far as Toyota is concerned, it was nothing new. The key to becom-
ing a learning organization is “learning how to learn” and Toyota seems to have
this down pretty well. An old truism is we learn by our mistakes and this is the
basis for much of the learning that goes on in Toyota and why “relentless reflec-
tion” or hansei is part of the Toyota culture.
Hansei means to continually be looking for the weaknesses in what you’re do-
ing, be it some process you’re responsible for or a program you’re running. And
by doing hansei, your ultimate goal is continual improvement (kaizen). Liker
quotes Bruce Brownlee, a general manager at the Toyota Technical Center34):
Hansei is really much deeper than reflection. It is really being honest about
your own weaknesses. If you are talking about only your strengths, your are
bragging. If you are recognizing your weaknesses with sincerity, it is a high
level of strength. But it does not end there. How do you change to overcome
those weaknesses? That is at the root of the very notion of kaizen.
And, as Liker points out, it is not easy for Americans to accept this essentially
Japanese cultural trait. In a traditional American program review setting the pro-
gram manager would expect to be praised for all his or her hard work. At Toyota
the emphasis is not so much on what went right but what are the weaknesses in
the program and how can they be overcome? Of course the idea is not to belittle
a person’s efforts but to improve things; however, initially anyway, an American
might take it as the former.
The ideal is to establish this hansei mindset in every employee so this con-
tinual reflection on what’s being done in terms of how it can be improved be-
comes second nature.
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Figure 10. An example of a “5-Whys” investigation (Liker, p. 253 from Scholtes, 1998)
Closely related to hansei is Toyota’s attention to problem solving and training
its people in it. We’ve already discussed this under the last principle about the
elements for making good decisions. For example, a lot of time is spent in un-
derstanding the true situation/problem including using genchi genbutsu. Once the
problem is well understood then the “five whys” are asked. This means asking
“why” five or more times as you progress back towards a root cause. Liker illus-
trates this with an example from Scholtes (Figure 10). Note that with each “why”
more and more information is gained about some weakness in the process or or-
ganization until a root cause is revealed for which an effective countermeasure
can be developed. By doing all this not only is the problem being solved but a
great deal of learning is taking place.
Another important element of creating a learning organization is Toyota’s em-
phasis on standardization as discussed under Principle 6. Without it very little
learning can occur since there will never be the stability needed to move to the
next higher level of excellence. Very generally and in terms of the Deming
PDCA cycle Toyota does this by (1) making a plan to improve a process by
changing it to create more flow (Principle 2), (2) introducing the change (the do
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35) Note, this is a slightly different view of this cycle from Liker’s on page 264.
step) which will usually surface problems, checking these problems and develop-
ing countermeasures, and finally, enacting the countermeasures.35) Once the pro-
cess with improved flow is stabilized, the cycle is repeated.
Perhaps one of the most important ways Toyota promotes learning is its use of
hoshin kanri, also known as policy deployment. It is a way to not only promote
learning and improvement but to ensure everyone in the organization is on the
same page. At the top of the organization quantified goals are developed that are
then “deployed” down the chain so each manager and even individual team mem-
bers have quantified supporting goals. Liker tells of meeting with a group leader
who was able to immediately show him his goals for the day. And these are not
just any goals but usually challenging stretch goals that, in effect, force learning
to take place.
A final word about Toyota as a learning organization: Toyota is process-ori-
ented. Most companies are results-oriented; that is, focused on how much they
can make or sell or how much money they can make in a quarter. Toyota’s
emphasis on learning is in terms of how to improve its processes be they for
making a Camry or developing the next concept car. With good processes Toyota
knows the results will follow and surely that’s being proven true today.
4. Summary and Conclusion
Starting with the values Sakichi Toyoda learned from his father and continu-
ing with the preservation, enhancement, and passing on of those values right up
to the present day, Toyota has become one of the most successful, admired, and
imitated companies in the world. Appendix D is a good summary of those values
as Toyota sees and practices them today. Throughout its history Toyota has had
to overcome many problems. Not only has Toyota been able to do this, it has also
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shown it can radically innovate as demonstrated with its Lexus and Prius devel-
opments. Toyota is expected to soon be the number one producer of cars in the
world, and this at a time when former powerhouses such as GM and Ford are
struggling to survive. What is it about the way Toyota operates that sets it apart
to be so successful? It is its values, and the specifics of how those values are
actually practiced are what Liker has tried to describe in his book on the 14 Prin-
ciples. The purpose of this paper has been to first describe Toyota by briefly tell-
ing its history and then summarize Liker’s 14 Principles.
Probably the most important message Liker wishes to convey is that it is not
simply the Toyota Production System (TPS) that accounts for Toyota’s success
but something bigger called the Toyota Way. This is what the 14 Principles, in
effect, describe. Probably the reason so many companies that try to imitate
Toyota never achieve its level of performance is they, either consciously or not,
have failed to develop a culture essentially based on the Toyota Way. Unless you
are thinking long-term, developing your people, and striving to truly become a
learning organization, practicing the TPS is only working at a surface level and
will never result in true excellence. In fact, as companies often find, it becomes
very difficult to sustain a good lean TPS-like operation without a change in their
culture, and that’s the really hard part.
Towards this end, Liker finishes his book with two chapters on “applying the
Toyota Way to our organization.” He has also co-authored a “fieldbook” (Liker
& Meier, 2006) to provide even more guidance to those interested in seriously
pursuing such a cultural change.
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Appendix A
Partial List of Firms Established By Toyota
(History of Toyota, 2006)
Firm YearEstablished
Toyoda Seiko, Ltd. (currently Aichi Steel Works, Ltd.) 1940
Toyoda Physical and Chemical Research Institute 1940
Toyota Machine Works Co., Ltd. 1941
Tokai Hikoki Co., Ltd. (currently Aisin Seiki Co., Ltd.) 1943
Toyota Shatai Kogyo Co., Ltd. (currently Toyota Auto Body Co., Ltd.) 1945
Kanto Electric Auto Manufacturing, Ltd. (currently Kanto Auto Works,
1946Ltd.)
Nisshin Tsusho Co., Ltd. (currently Toyota Tsusho Corporation) 1948
Nagoya Rubber Co., Ltd. (currently Toyoda Gosei Co., Ltd.) 1949
Nippondenso Co., Ltd. (currently Denso Corporation) 1949
Toyota Motor Sales Co., Ltd. 1950
Minsei Spinning Co., Ltd. (currently Toyoda Boshoku Corporation) 1950
Towa Real Estate Co., Ltd. established 1953
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. 1957
Toyota Central Research & Development Laboratories, Inc. 1960
Calty Design Research, Inc. (in Newport Beach, California) 1973
Toyota Technical Center U.S.A., Inc. (in Ann Arbor, Michigan) 1977
Note: Toyota has established many other firms. This is just a representative sample to
emphasize how Toyota used (and continues to use) this technique for enhancing its
core operations.
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Appendix B (page 1 of 5)
Deming’s Fourteen Points
(Deming, 1986, pp. 23–24)
Point 1: Create constancy of purpose towards improvement of product and
service, with the aim to become competitive and to stay in business, and to pro-
vide jobs. Here Deming is stressing the need for management to make a real
commitment to quality so that everyone else in the company has confidence that
there will be a future. Specifically, management must innovate, put resources in
research and education, and “constantly improve the design of product and ser-
vice.” Management must be concerned with business far beyond the next
quarter’s dividends!
Point 2: Adopt the new philosophy. We are in a new economic age. Western
management must awaken to the challenge, must learn their responsibilities, and
take on leadership for change. According to Deming, for the transformation (of
Western management) to occur: “We can no longer tolerate commonly accepted
levels of mistakes, defects, material not suited for the job, people on the job that
do not know what the job is and are afraid to ask...” (p. 26). Citing the precision
with which the Japanese train system operates—as opposed to what we often find
in America or Europe, for example—Deming relates this set of instructions for
getting to a company in Japan: “0903 h Board the train. Pay no attention to trains
at 0858, 0901. 0957 h Off.”
Point 3: Cease reliance on mass inspection to achieve quality. Eliminate the
need for inspection on a mass basis by building quality into the product in the
first place. The main idea here is that it is better to randomly sample the
process’s output for purposes of maintaining statistical quality control rather than
having 100% inspection. Deming mentions a printing company that had prided
itself on proofreading everything eleven times yet still needed help due to con-
stant customer complaints. The problem: each of the eleven inspectors relied on
the other ten! In other words: you can’t inspect quality into a product or service.
Instead, you should work to constantly improve the process—improved quality
will automatically result.
Point 4: End the practice of awarding business on the basis of price tag.
Instead, minimize total cost. Move toward a single supplier for any one item, on
a long-term relationship of loyalty and trust. Deming quotes from an actual gov-
ernment advertisement for professional help: “For delivery and evaluation of a
course on management for quality control for supervisors... An order will be
issued on the basis of price.” Worse yet, such a practice will drive those who
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would have delivered good products and services out of business. Common sense
tells us that you can’t make quality products out of poor quality material. The
other idea contained in this point is that it is a good idea to establish long-term
relationships with your suppliers. This way you can work together to improve the
quality of the supplies and, accordingly, that of the product in which they are
used. As the product’s quality improves and it becomes more successful, the
additional profit can be shared with the supplier thus encouraging further
improvements!
Point 5: Improve constantly and forever the system of production and service,
to improve quality and productivity, and thus constantly decrease costs. Some of
the things Deming mentions here are continual improvement through a better
understanding of customer requirements, development of better relationships with
suppliers, doing a better job of hiring, training, and supporting workers, and con-
sidering/experimenting with all ways that a process might be made better (maybe
just by changing the temperature or humidity).
Point 6: Institute training on the job. Deming cites an example, perhaps all too
common, of a worker simply being told to “go to work” without having the job
explained to him and, to make matters worse, a foreman who “knows nothing.”
Managers need to be trained in all aspects of the company operation and given
an appreciation of variation. Unfortunately, most American managers have not
had experience at the “factory floor” level. Deming also brings up the importance
of recognizing that people learn in different ways.
Point 7: Institute leadership. The aim of supervision should be to help people
and machines and gadgets to do a better job. Supervision of management is in
need of overhaul, as well as supervision of production workers. Deming here is
saying the job of management is not “passive” supervision but “leadership”
supervision. This means knowing enough about the worker’s job to be able to
give him or her the help needed. It also means not managing by the numbers as
in “zero defects” or just meeting or not meeting some specification. The goal of
leadership should be to empower (with the training and equipment needed) and
encourage the worker to continually improve the process, not meet some rela-
tively arbitrary specification or make some quota number.
Point 8: Drive out fear, so that everyone may work effectively for the company.
Workers and supervisors will often do what management wants out of fear, even
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if it has long-term adverse consequences. One example Deming cites is a fore-
man who knew the production line needed to be shut down for repairs but took a
chance in an attempt to meet management’s quota for castings. When his worst
fears were realized, not only wasn’t the quota met, but also the line was down
for four days for repairs! Fear will lead to such things as an inspector passing
poor quality products and fudging figures. A secure environment must be created
where the worker knows it is OK to report a problem and where a spirit of work-
ing together to solve problems prevails over blaming.
Point 9: Break down barriers between departments. People in research,
design, sales, and production must work as a team, to foresee problems of pro-
duction and in use that may be encountered with the product or service. Another
common problem in companies is the left hand not knowing what the right hand
is doing. Deming gives the example of a perennial design problem that the ser-
vicemen continued to correct because there was no system for feedback to manu-
facturing to eliminate the problem in the first place! Departments need to think
in terms of who their internal customers are and develop a good working rela-
tionship with them.
Point 10: Eliminate slogans, exhortations, and targets for the work force ask-
ing for zero defects and new levels of productivity. Such exhortations only create
adversarial relationships, since the bulk of the causes of low quality and low pro-
ductivity belong to the system and thus lie beyond the power of the work force.
What good are slogans when nothing is changed to help the worker do a better
job? Deming’s famous Red Bead experiment dramatically demonstrates the futil-
ity of exhorting workers to do better when the system remains the same. As the
experiment shows, the (management created) system will never allow the work-
ers to do better until management changes it.
Point 11a: Eliminate work standards (quotas) on the factory floor. Substitute
leadership.
Point 11b: Eliminate management by objectives. Eliminate management by the
numbers, numerical goals. Substitute leadership. As Deming so eloquently points
out, work standards (quotas) are great demoralizers. Take the case of the woman
required to handle 25 reservation/information calls an hour for some airline. Due
to circumstances beyond her control, calls often took longer than the average of
1/25 of an hour (2.4 minutes) the standard called for. The result was a dilemma:
either give courteous and helpful service or rush the call, often angering the cus-
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tomer. Instead the process must be studied and systematically improved.
As for management by the numbers, the main problem is saying “we will in-
crease productive (or anything) by, say, 10% next year” without a plan or method
for doing so. It’s as if somehow that increase will occur without any change in
the way the company has been doing business—impossible, with a lot of frustra-
tion being the only result.
Point 12a: Remove barriers that rob the hourly workers of their right to pride
of workmanship. The responsibility of supervisors must be changed from mere
numbers to quality.
Point 12b: Remove barriers that rob people in management and in engineer-
ing of their right to pride of workmanship. This means, inter alia, abolishment of
the annual review or merit rating and of management by objectives. Some of the
barriers to pride of workmanship cited by Deming in Out of the Crisis are: fore-
men who are afraid to make decisions or don’t know their job well enough to
give leadership, equipment not working right, inadequate training, and being re-
quired to use poor quality materials. Deming cites many real-life examples.
Point 12b, about eliminating the annual review or merit rating, is perhaps the
only point that is controversial. However, Deming’s basis for this point is similar
to that for Point 3, Cease reliance on mass inspection. As Deming puts it:
Basically what is wrong is that the performance appraisal or merit rating fo-
cuses on the end product, at the end of the stream, not on leadership to help
people. This is the way to avoid the problem of people. A manager becomes,
in effect, manager of defects [emphasis added]. (p. 102)
Besides this, such rating systems tend to foster competition among workers rather
than teamwork. They also tend to foster an attitude of “not rocking the boat” and
focusing more on how to get a good rating (e.g., tell the boss what he/she wants
to hear) rather than using the knowledge possessed to help the company.
Instead, Deming says the performance of all workers doing a similar job
should be tracked and plotted on a control chart. Should anyone’s performance
fall outside reasonable limits, an investigation should be conducted to determine
the cause (inadequate training, bad equipment, etc.). It is usually the system, not
the individual worker that is at fault when something goes wrong or there is poor
performance. In fact, according to Scholtes, et al. (1996, p. A-4), about 85 per-
cent of the problems an organization encounters are due to the system. Given that
you have been careful to select good people, given them appropriate training and
the chance to gain experience, and provided motivation, they will almost invari-
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Appendix B (page 5 of 5)
Deming’s Fourteen Points
able do a good job if the system lets them.
Point 13: Institute a vigorous program of education and self-improvement. As
opposed to Point 6, Institute training on the job, this one is talking about just
making your people better through education and other means such as giving
them additional responsibilities. To quote Deming from Out of the Crisis:
“People require in their careers, more than money, ever-broadening opportunities
to add something to society, materially and otherwise” (p. 86).
Point 14: Put everybody in the company to work to accomplish the transfor-
mation. The transformation is everybody’s job. This simply means moving be-
yond words to action. Management must study, understand, and agree on what
the other 13 points mean and then disseminate this information to all the others
in the company and develop concrete plans for accomplishing the points with
everyone’s involvement.
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(Toyota Environmental & Social Report 2003, under Social and Economic
Aspects, Employees)
The basic concepts of mutual trust between labor and management are:
improvements in the lives of employees are realized through the prosperity of the
company, and labor and management thus share the same goal of company pros-
perity as a common value; management will take into consideration to the great-
est possible extent stable employment and will continuously strive to improve
working conditions; and employees will cooperate with the company’s policies in
order to promote the company’s prosperity.
In the Labor and Management Resolutions for the 21st Century signed by
labor and management representatives in 1996, mutual respect was added to
mutual trust as a foundation of labor-management relations, and this is reflected
in the current Guiding Principles at Toyota Motor Corporation. (Below is
Toyota’s view of the “mutual trust between labor and management.”)
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Appendix D
Guiding Principles at Toyota*
(Guiding Principles, 2006)
1. Honor the language and spirit of the law of every nation and undertake open
and fair corporate activities to be a good corporate citizen of the world.
2. Respect the culture and customs of every nation and contribute to economic
and social development through corporate activities in the communities.
3. Dedicate ourselves to providing clean and safe products and to enhancing the
quality of life everywhere through all our activities.
4. Create and develop advanced technologies and provide outstanding products
and services that fulfill the needs of customers worldwide.
5. Foster a corporate culture that enhances individual creativity and teamwork
value, while honoring mutual trust and respect between labor and manage-
ment.
6. Pursue growth in harmony with the global community through innovative
management.
7. Work with business partners in research and creation to achieve stable, long-
term growth and mutual benefits, while keeping ourselves open to new part-
nerships.
*Adopted in 1992

